The strongest of all governmental powers is the power to engage in war; and the strongest challenge for constitutionalism is to bring the war power of the state under meaningful control. The 1787 Constitution allocated some military powers to the Congress and others to the President as part of the scheme of constitutional checks and balances. To this day, however, the distribution of authority between the branches remains contested and uncertain.
The Clinton Administration has had substantial opportunity to contribute to the evolution of constitutional practice concerning war powers, by virtue of numerous occasions of combat deployments, cruise missile strikes, and other forms of military engagement since January 1993. In broad outline, the constitutional practice of the Clinton Administration concerning war powers is similar to that of previous administrations in the sense that sweeping claims of executive authority have been tempered through pragmatic political accommodation. The legal opinions issued to explain the constitutional and statutory rationales for executive military initiatives embody some subtle differences from those of other administrations. This article compares the record of the Clinton Administration with those of its predecessors, after first briefly locating U.S. war powers practice in the context of crossnational comparisons.
The subject of the Clinton Administration and war powers can be addressed from a crossnational perspective, along the lines of the comparative constitutional research on war powers I have been pursuing in other writing. 1 In relation to the military intervention in Kosovo, for example, how did President Clinton's exercise of executive power compare to the authority of the heads of state or heads of government in the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") that participated in the operation? Were other chief executives constitutionally authorized to commit their forces to a military campaign without reference to their national parliaments, as President Clinton effectively did, or are such decisions shared with parliament in the respective constitutional systems?
Crossnational comparisons show variations in the degree to which national parliaments participated in determining the nature of a given state's commitment to the NATO engagement in Kosovo. President Clinton was not the only NATO leader who initiated his country's participation in the Kosovo operation without obtaining explicit authorization from the legislative branch. In the parliamentary system of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair may assume support from the House of Commons without necessarily putting the matter to a formal vote. 2 In France's mixed system, President Jacques Chirac operates under Gaullist premises that military decisions belong to the presidential domaine reservé with little scrutiny from the Assemblée Nationale. 3 In other countries, however, parliamentary control is considered a fundamental constraint on executive war-making powers. Germany's postwar constitution broke with the past by renouncing war, but participation in collective defense or collective security organizations is constitutionally permitted, subject to parliamentary approval. 4 Notably, as required by a decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court at an earlier stage of the Yugoslav conflict, 5 the Bundestag had to act affirmatively to approve German involvement in the Kosovo campaign. 6 Polities in transition have looked to diverse constitutional models in developing their own approaches to executive-legislative relations with respect to war powers. The newest NATO members and NATO aspirants had their first tests of constitutional control of war powers in the post-cold war era with the Kosovo crisis. Hungary, a front-line state for this conflict, which borders on Yugoslavia and has close ties to ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina region of Serbia, submitted certain critical decisions for the affirmative authorization of the national parliament. 1973) . President Nixon's constitutional objections included the concurrent veto feature of § 5(c), as well as the automatic cut-off of certain authorities after sixty days in the absence of a congressional extension: "I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. The only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution-and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force." Id.
13. To underscore that a joint resolution has the full authority of an enacted statute, some prefer that the War Powers Resolution be known as the "War Powers Act." See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 115 (1994).
14. See Johnsen, supra note 9, 27-28.
President Ford complied with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution in relation to evacuations from Danang, Phnom Penh, and Saigon, and the retaking of the SS Mayaguez. 15 Nonetheless, he maintained the position of principle that the War Powers Resolution could not impair the President's constitutionally-based powers. 16 When reporting to Congress as the War Powers Resolution provides, 17 neither Ford nor his successors ever conceded that any legally operational significance would attach to a report submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." 18 In other words, no President has ever acknowledged the Resolution's timetable of sixty or ninety days for withdrawal of troops (unless Congress were to authorize their participation in hostilities) 19 to be running. 20 President Carter had fewer warlike incidents during his tenure than either his predecessors or his successors: Only the failed Iran hostage rescue raid brought the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution into play during the Carter Administration. 21 President Carter's counsel, Lloyd Cutler, wrote a legal opinion stating that consultation with Congress was not required in advance of that mission because the War Powers Resolution by its terms merely provides for consultation "in every possible instance."
22 Thus, the implication is that Congress must have contemplated instances-of which the Iran raid could be exemplary-in which consultation would be impossible. Furthermore, Cutler argued, the Resolution should be construed to avoid impinging on the President's inherent constitutional power to conduct a rescue operation that is dependent on total surprise. During the Iran hostage crisis, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department addressed a variety of questions respecting potential uses of force in the Persian Gulf region and in general affirmed a wide scope of independent presidential authority to undertake the sorts of military operations then under contemplation. 23 The opinion concluded that the War Powers Resolution "has neither the purpose nor the effect of modifying the President's [constitutional] power" in the circumstances envisaged, although constitutional issues could arise in the event of purported termination of an exercise of presidential power either by concurrent resolution or by lapse of time.
24 Consistent with the position taken in President Nixon's veto message (and later endorsed by the Supreme Court in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha 25 ), the opinion argued that Congress could not require the removal of armed forces by means of a mere concurrent resolution. Yet it apparently acknowledged that Congress could control the duration of troop commitments through legislation that the President would have an opportunity to veto.
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In a notable divergence from the positions of Presidents Nixon and Ford, who believed that the arbitrary timetables of the Resolution could not constitutionally compel termination of an otherwise permissible presidential use of force, the opinion found sufficient flexibility in the Resolution's scheme to safeguard the President's constitutional authority:
We believe that Congress may, as a general constitutional matter, place a 60-day limit on the use of our armed forces as required by the provisions of § 1544(b) of the Resolution. The Resolution gives the President the flexibility to extend that deadline for up to 30 days in cases of ["]unavoidable military necessity.
["] This flexibility is, we believe, sufficient under any scenarios we can hypothesize to preserve his constitutional function as Commander-in-Chief. The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift the burden to the President to convince the Congress of the continuing need for the use of our armed forces abroad. We cannot say that placing that burden on the President unconstitutionally intrudes upon his executive powers.
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It has been observed that this concession of congressional power to regulate presidential authority by statute "probably has not been uniformly admitted by the executive branch" and that it should not be assumed to represent the views of other administrations. 26. See Harmon Opinion, supra note 23, at 186 (stating that " [w] e believe that Congress may terminate presidentially initiated hostilities through the enactment of legislation, but that it cannot do so by means of a legislative veto device such as a concurrent resolution"). deployment to Somalia. 35 An opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel about the Somalia operation found no significant concerns about the War Powers Resolution because the troops were not expected to be involved in combat. 36 The record from the Nixon Administration up to the onset of the Clinton Administration can thus be summarized as follows: No President explicitly conceded that Congress has a constitutional entitlement to share in the decision to introduce troops into hostilities; no president conceded that Congress could constitutionally control the Commander-in-Chief in the exercise of his Article II powers; yet patterns of compliance with the War Powers Resolution did emerge that are suggestive of an unwillingness to force differences of principle to a concrete confrontation.
III THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND WAR POWERS
The Clinton Administration has followed basically in this tradition, with some nuances. One could suggest two different interpretations of the Clinton record. Under the first interpretation, the Clinton Administration has acted essentially like its predecessors by preserving a broad view of executive power on the plane of principle, and likewise by refraining from pressing matters to a confrontation. President Clinton thus maintained continuity with previous administrations by asserting shortly before the September 1994 operation in Haiti that "[l]ike my predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get" congressional approval for a military action of the sort contemplated in Haiti. 37 Under an alternative interpretation, the Clinton Administration has arguably been more forthcoming than most predecessor administrations in issuing formal legal opinions suggestive of some constitutionally-based role for Congress, at least where "'war' in the constitutional sense" is 35 involved. 38 The following discussion traces the Clinton Administration's legal position through several important military engagements during the last seven years.
A. Iraq
Continuing the policy directions set by his predecessor, President Clinton has recurrently applied military force against Iraq throughout his Administration. Early in his presidency, President Clinton used cruise missiles against Baghdad in response to a foiled assassination attempt against ex-President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in early 1993. 39 On December 16, 1998, on the eve of his impeachment by the House of Representatives, President Clinton launched another round of cruise missiles against Iraq, in response to Iraq's repudiation of the U.N. regime for supervising elimination of weapons of mass destruction. 40 One plausible legal basis for these actions (and various other actions throughout his presidency) could be the Iraq Resolution of January 14, 1991, which by its terms conferred open-ended authority on the President to use U.S. armed forces to achieve implementation of a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions, the last of which authorized U.N. member states not only to assist in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait but also "to restore international peace and security in the region." 41 As required by the Iraq Resolution, the Administration has periodically reported to Congress on its efforts to achieve compliance with the Security Council resolutions. 42 The legislative branch has evidently accepted (or at least has taken no steps at odds with) the executive claim of sufficient authority to deal forcibly with Iraq throughout the 1990s.
B. Somalia
The conflict in Somalia was also inherited from the previous administration. As one of the last major decisions of his presidency, taken in December 1992, President Bush sent troops to Somalia for humanitarian reasons, with only the most slender reed on which to hang an inference of congressional approval. 43 When the new Congress convened in early 1993, the Senate shortly passed one version of an authorizing resolution by voice vote, 44 but by the time the House took up the measure a few months later, the objectives of the mission had shifted in controversial directions. 45 The House eventually passed an amendment that would have authorized military action with limitations as to both purpose and duration, but the Senate and the House never reconciled these differences. 46 American troops were still in Somalia in October 1993, having undergone even more significant "mission creep" without the benefit of specific congressional authorization or much attention from the public, until the tragic day when eighteen Army Rangers lost their lives in an armed confrontation with one of the Somali factions. 47 Congress soon mobilized itself to pass a measure cutting off funding for the deployment in Somalia as of March 31, 1994.
48 President Clinton, however, had already made a preemptive announcement of his intention to withdraw the troops by that date, so he could hardly complain that Congress acted unconstitutionally in exercising its power of the purse to the same effect. 49 The troops were indeed withdrawn by the cut-off date. Later, in reaction to the Somalia experience, Congress imposed new reporting and consultation requirements for prospective U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations. as U.S. troops were departing for what turned out to be a negotiated resolution of the crisis rather than a bloody invasion. 51 The Dellinger opinion is one of the more reflective essays on the War Powers Resolution to emanate from the executive branch in twenty-five years. Rather than asserting insuperable constitutional defects in the War Powers Resolution, the opinion argues for an interpretation that would avoid or minimize the area of constitutional dispute, by construing the Resolution to presuppose a sphere in which Congress expected that the President would be able to act on his own authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into low-level hostilities of relatively brief duration. Although I have written elsewhere that another construction may make more sense of what Congress actually did in the Resolution than the construction proffered in the Dellinger opinion, 52 the opinion in my view marks a notable and welcome departure from the attitudes of prior administrations. In particular, it seems to accept that, for as long as the War Powers Resolution remains on the books, that resolution is indeed part of the operative corpus of law and is to be taken seriously. Moreover, the Dellinger letter also appears to proceed from the assumption that, in cases of initiation of major conflict, Congress would be constitutionally required to participate.
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In other words, the Clinton Administration's point of view does seem somewhat closer to the spirit of the Constitution as understood by the Congress in enacting the War Powers Resolution than to the attitudes of previous administrations. 
D. Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Clinton Administration did not directly acknowledge any requirement under the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution to submit the issue of military operations in former Yugoslavia for congressional approval. Before the deployment of ground troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina in implementation of the Dayton Agreement, 56 U.S. military power had already been applied in the Balkan theater. U.S. vessels participated in interdiction operations in the Adriatic Sea in enforcement of the U.N. embargo, and U.S. air power policed the no-flight zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and "safe havens" in Bosnian territory, and mounted air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions after the Srebrenica massacre.
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As part of the Dayton negotiations, President Clinton committed some 20,000 U.S. troops to the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although preserving his position that congressional authorization was not constitutionally required, 58 President Clinton stated that he would "welcome" an appropriate expression of congressional support. 59 What transpired in the Congress was murkier than the President would have preferred. Shortly before the President left for the formal signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole obtained a favorable vote in the Senate on a resolution expressing that body's "unequivocal[] support[]" for the troops to be sent to Bosnia but "reservations" about the presidential decision to dispatch them. 60 The best that could be wheedled out of the House of Representatives was a backhanded statement of "pride and admiration" for the troops but "serious concerns and opposition to the President's policy."
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The previous day, both chambers had voted down proposals that would have restricted funds for the deployment. 62 As Professor Stromseth has concluded, "[i]n the end, Congress as a body opted neither to block the deployment of American combat forces to Bosnia nor to authorize it." 64 One of the reasons cited for the veto was a provision that would have attached a certification requirement to presidential decisions to place U.S. armed forces under the operational or tactical control of the United Nations, which Clinton characterized as an infringement on his constitutional authority as commander in chief. 65 The House failed to override the veto. 66 Later, Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger supplied a legal memorandum detailing the Administration's views on the unconstitutionality of such restrictions on presidential authority:
It is for the President alone, as Commander-in-Chief, to make the choice of the particular personnel who are to exercise operational and tactical command functions over the U.S. Armed Forces. . . . In the present context, the President may determine that the purposes of a particular U.N. operation in which U.S. Armed Forces participate would be best served if those forces were placed under the operational or tactical control of an agent of the U.N., as well as under a U.N. senior military commander who was a foreign national (or U.S. national who is not an active duty military officer). Congress may not prevent the President from acting on such a military judgment concerning the choice of the commanders under whom the U.S. forces engaged in the mission are to serve.
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The memorandum is broadly consistent with legal positions of previous administrations that have interpreted the Commander in Chief Clause as establishing a sphere of presidential command authority into which Congress may not intrude.
E. Sudan and Afghanistan
In August 1998, President Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks against a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that was alleged to be a chemical weapons facility and against sites in Afghanistan identified as terrorist training camps. 69 The rationale for the attacks was intelligence information indicating that the sites were part of a terrorist network connected with Usama bin Laden, who was al- 72 This was a far more substantial use of military force than in previous deployments (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina) that had at least initially been characterized as not intended to result in combat. In Kosovo, the combatant posture was undeniable, yet the Clinton Administration couched its formal submissions so as to avoid an explicit acknowledgment that either "hostilities" within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution or "'war' in the constitutional sense" was involved.
In the first report filed "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" on March 26, 1999, and in another report in the first week in April, President Clinton recited that he had "taken into account the views and support expressed by the Congress" in concurrent resolutions and that he "appreciate[d] the [continued] support of the Congress in this action."
73 Yet neither at the outbreak of the conflict nor subsequently did Congress enact a specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Indeed, the several votes taken before and during the conflict were highly ambiguous. After the House voted in late April on a series of separate and inconsistent measures, including to defeat by a tie vote a measure of symbolic support for the air strikes, a White House spokesman expressed understandable frustration in saying that the Administration would press on with the bombing campaign: At the same time, President Clinton tendered to the congressional leadership assurances that Congress would indeed be involved in any decision to introduce ground troops into hostilities:
[W]ere I to change my policy with regard to the introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a nonpermissive environment. 75 The statement fits the now-familiar pattern of preserving the executive position on the plane of principle while presenting an accommodating stance on the plane of practical politics.
IV THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IN LITIGATION OVER WAR AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In Campbell v. Clinton, certain members of Congress brought suit on claims grounded in the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution in an effort to obtain judicial vindication of their position that Congress was constitutionally and statutorily required to approve the participation of U.S. armed forces in the Kosovo conflict. 76 The Clinton Administration followed the consistent practice of its predecessors in urging that legislative plaintiffs could not have standing to sue on constitutional or statutory claims, that the issues were not ripe for adjudication, and that the case should be considered barred under the political question doctrine or otherwise nonjusticiable.
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After recounting the several congressional votes taken in the midst of the Kosovo crisis, which had neither explicitly authorized nor blocked the continuation of the conflict, 78 80 Within a few days of the district court's decision, active combat had ceased and U.S. armed forces were entering Kosovo in a noncombatant posture for implementation of the terms of settlement of the conflict. 81 Though its litigating position in Campbell was predictable, the Clinton Administration has, in my opinion, gone too far in straining to avoid adjudication on the merits in foreign relations contexts. In Breard v. Greene, 82 a death penalty case involving rights under a treaty of the United States, 83 the Administration essentially argued that there was no forum competent to provide a remedy for the conceded treaty violation. 84 In the lower federal court, the statement of interest of the United States as amicus curiae argued that domestic courts should not take cognizance of the treaty claim. 85 Along with a variety of threshold objections (including an expansive invocation of the political question doctrine), the government maintained that U.S. courts were foreclosed from hearing the case because the treaty itself provided for disputes under the treaty to be heard at the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") in The Hague. 86 Yet when the aggrieved foreign state thereupon invoked this treaty right to sue in the ICJ, the United States urged that body to decline jurisdiction on the grounds (among others) that there was no genuine dispute between the parties and that the treaty claim had not been properly preserved in domestic courts. 87 Then, when the ICJ entered an interim order calling on the United States to "take all measures at its disposal" to ensure that Breard would not be executed, the Solicitor General declined to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to enter a stay of execution. 88 In essence, the federal government's position was that the federal judiciary lacks power to give effect to a claim of right under a treaty, and that the remedy (if any) within our federal system would have to come from the Governor of Virginia 89 -one of the more bizarre views of federalism ever to emanate from the federal executive branch!
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The Breard matter presents one variant of the issue raised in Professor Johnsen's paper 91 concerning the responsibility of the President under the Take Care Clause. 92 Are treaty obligations part of the "law of the land," 93 and if so, what is the responsibility of the President to see that they are enforced? Professor Johnsen prefers an approach under which the executive branch would craft its position so that disputes are more likely to be heard on their merits in the Article III mode; she would presumably disfavor executive branch maneuverings to avoid a justiciable case or controversy. 94 In my view (and that of many other commentators on Breard), 95 the Clinton Administration abdicated its responsibility to ensure a fair adjudication of the merits of the claim of treaty violation.
V CONCLUSION: A CLINTON DOCTRINE ON WAR POWERS?
The Kosovo conflict has prompted some commentators to discern a "Clinton Doctrine" of humanitarian intervention, in the President's affirmation that he might well authorize a comparable response to future Kosovo-like situations if U.S. military power could help abate other humanitarian catastrophes.
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The Clinton Administration's constitutional doctrine on war powers, however, is only subtly different from that of its predecessors, in the sense of a slightly more deferential attitude toward the role of Congress under the governing framework legislation. A less confrontational stance may be motivated as much by politics as by principle, since this President can ill afford to antagonize Congress unnecessarily. 90. The symposium audience will be glad to know that Walter Dellinger had left the position of Acting Solicitor General and had returned to his professorship at Duke University School of Law before the filing of the amicus brief in Breard.
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